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Abstract: In this paper we explore how social influence may cause a non-linear transition from a clean to a lit-
tered environment, andwhat strategies are eective in keeping a street clean. To study this, we first implement
the Goal Framing Theory of Lindenberg and Steg (2007) in an agent based model. Next, using empirical data
from a field study we parameterise themodel so we can replicate the results from a field study. Following that,
we explore howdierent cleaning strategies perform. The results indicate that an adaptive/dynamical cleaning
regime is more eective and cheaper than pre-defined cleaning schedules.
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Introduction
1.1 Littering is a problem in many public and private places. Besides the esthetical disturbance, littering also has
a negative impact on the quality of the natural environment, e.g. by the diusion of plastic waste. To identify
possible strategies for mitigating this behaviour many scholars have studied why and when people litter. A
key driver of littering is the presence of litter in the environment, but also anti-litter signs (prompts), punishing
littering and rewarding non-littering play a role (see e.g., Geller et al. 1982; Dwyer et al. 1993; Human et al.
1995). Sibley & Liu (2003) distinguish between active littering (throwing litter on the street when walking) and
passive littering (leaving litter behind whenmoving away), the latter behaviour being more diicult to change.
In this paper, we will focus on active littering behaviour, defined as the dropping of litter whilst the littering
person continues walking along. This active type of littering has been studied in the seminal work of Cialdini
et al. (1990), who showed that people are very susceptible to the littering behaviour of other people (Reno et al.
1993; Kallgren et al. 2000, see also). In field experiments, they showed people are littering more when in a
littered environment. Cialdini et al. (1990) explained that the observed degree of littering describes the norm
of other people (descriptive norm). This descriptive norm is frequently being followed by other people. Many
studies demonstrated that littered environments stimulate people to litter, e.g. in grocery stores (Geller et al.
1977), picnic areas (Crump et al. 1977), waiting rooms (Krauss et al. 1978), a parking garage (Reiter & Samuel
1980; Cialdini et al. 1990; Reno et al. 1993), the lobby of a dormitory (Ramos et al. 2012), an alley in a city centre
(Keizer et al. 2011) and theareaaroundawaste collectionpoint in aneighbourhood (Dur&Vollaard2015). Norms
thus play an important role in the regulation of human behaviour, also in the case of littering. Whereas usually
a small proportion of the population is violating norms to some extent, most people abide to norms such as
not parking cars on sidewalks, not smoking in public buildings, queuing for e.g. a ticket sale and not littering on
the street. Sometimes however, it looks like the norm is collapsing, and an increasing number of people appear
to disrespect the norm, resulting in littered streets, smoking in bars and restaurants. In many situations, most
people dislike this disrespect for the norms, but sometimes it is considered to be appropriate behaviour, such
as littering plastic cups on festivals. In this context it is interesting that research by Keep America Beautiful
(Wesley Schultz 2009) found thatmost people expressed a strong personal obligation not to litter, but that 43%
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admitted to have littered in the past month. Recoveries from littered environments can also be observed, e.g.
in clean-up actions where a street or neighbourhood is being cleaned by inhabitants.
1.2 However, questions that remained unanswered were how for example graiti may have an eect on littering,
because the presence of graiti does not address a descriptive littering norm. Furthermore, the process ex-
plaining how for example signs addressing a particular norm can have eects on other behaviourwas not clear.
TheGoal FramingTheory of Lindenberg&Steg (2007) explains suchprocesses bypostulating that goals "frame"
the way people process information and act upon it. Three goal frames are distinguished by Lindenberg & Steg
(2007): the hedonic goal "to feel better right now", the gain goal "to guard and improve one’s resources", and
the normative goal "to act appropriately". When such a goal is activated (i.e., when it is the "focal" goal, or, as
it is called here, a "goal frame"), it will influence what persons think of at the moment, what information they
are sensitive to, what action alternatives they perceive, and how they will act (see Lindenberg & Steg 2007, p.
119). In a littering context the hedonic motive would focus on getting rid of a piece of litter, e.g. by throwing it
on the street or in a bin, whereas the normative motive would focus on keeping the environment clean, e.g. by
throwing litter in a bin or to keep it with you. The gain goal, which is related to personal profit, is not relevant
in the littering context, as keeping litter with you, throwing it in a bin or on the street will have no impact on
your personal resources. Essential in the Goal Framing Theory is that the strength of the focal goal may be in-
fluenced by other goals that are in the background. This relates to the "broken windows theory" as coined by
Wilson&Kelling (1982), which states that if a neighbourhood is not cleaned regularly, and broken thinks such as
windows are not repaired fast enough, the neighbourhoodwill get trapped in a negative spiral of pollution, van-
dalism and criminal behaviour. Empirical validation for this process comes from a series of field experiments
conducted by Keizer et al. (2011). They demonstrate that the violation of a norm not directly related to the tar-
get behaviour results in people less complying with the norm. Therefore, when a norm is being disrespected
bymany people, the normative motive is less focal, causing people to behavemore according to their hedonic
and gain motives. On the contrary, when a single person violates the norm, the norm will become more focal,
and people will abide more to the norm. Aer conducting a series of six field experiments, Keizer et al. (2008)
conclude that when people observe others violating a social norm or legitimate rule, they are more likely to
violate other norms or rules themselves, which causes disorder to spread. Most interestingly, the Goal Frame
Theory explains how a prompt "not to litter" may further deactivate the norm in littered conditions and cause
more people to litter, an eect that has been found in the field experiments of Keizer et al. (2011). In a clean en-
vironment the "not to litter" prompt indeed reduces littering. Interestingly, a single piece of litter also functions
as a prompt, reducing the littering. This can be explained by the single piece of litter making the norm – most
people do not litter – evenmore focal.
1.3 If littering is substantially being influenced by the (de)activation of the normative motive, this implies that in
field situations a strong social feedbackmechanism is present. When litter starts to build up, thiswill deactivate
the normativemotive, which in turnwill causemore people to start littering. Such a self-amplifying behavioural
eect may cause a transition from a clean to a littered environment to develop in a non-linear way. When lit-
tering is increasing, at a certainmoment a tipping point will be reachedwhere the non-littering norm collapses
(e.g., Nyborg et al. 2016). This means that more litter is present, the more people will litter, causing a stronger
growth in littering behaviour. Relevant questions that arise are (1) how fast can norms concerning keeping an
environment clean collapse? And (2) what strategies can be thought of to prevent such a collapse? In particular
wewant to explore if there exists a transition in social systems between a state wheremost people abide to the
norm, and a statewheremost people disrespect the norm. If we are capable to identify the process behind such
a transition, wemay also be capable of identifying strategies to avoid the collapse of norms.
1.4 Conducting such experiments in field settings is quite tedious. First, this would require a series of field experi-
ments in which the street is getting more littered over time. This is diicult to realise, as people in the experi-
mental setting are likely to complain andpossibly interferewith theexperimentwhen the street gets really dirty.
Moreover, if we systematicallywant to explore the eect of dierent cleaning regimesweneed to conductmany
experiments. It is very unlikely that people will not notice that experiments are being conducted in the street,
which is very likely to aect their behaviour. To keep full experimental control in a very straight settingwe there-
fore developed an agent-based simulation. Here, we program artificial people in a virtual street in a computer
model, and experiment with the behaviour of this population using the so-called agent-basedmodelling (ABM)
approach. Thismethodology has proven to be a suitable approach in exploring the dynamics of social complex
systems, and is gainingmomentum inmany disciplines (e.g., Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005). In agent-basedmodels,
agents can influence each other and follow simple rules that are programmed at the individual level. The chal-
lenge here is to develop an agent based model that formalises the Goal Framing Theory, and parameterise it
against empirical data.
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Payo for keeping Payo for throwing in the street
Hedonic Goal 0 Hi
Normative Goal Ni 0
Table 1: Pay-o structure for keeping litter or throwing in the street.
The Model
2.1 The Goal Framing Theory distinguishes a hedonic, a gain and a normativemotive. As indicated before, the gain
motive is not relevant in this context andwewill not further refer to thismotive in this paper. In ourmodel, each
agent i is defined by the values ofHi andNi, whereHi stands for the hedonic goal weight andNi stands for the
normative goal weight. During every step of the simulation, agents holding one ormore units of litter will act to
maximize their payo, which depends on both their goal weights. In the simplest version themodel, agents can
only choose between two possible actions: (i) keeping the litter or (ii) throwing the litter in the street. Hence,
agents will choose the first action ifNi > Hi.
2.2 Whereas the hedonicmotive can bemodelled really simple, as it refers to a fixed outcome schedule of possible
behaviour, the normativemotive is bringing in social complex dynamics as here we are dealing with the obser-
vation of other people’s behaviour, which feeds back on the importance of the ownmotives. The Goal Framing
Theory does not explicitly describe themechanism responsible for the activation of inhibition of the normative
motive. Aer consulting Lindenberg, Steg and Keizer, we chose to model this activation-inhibition process fol-
lowing a reinforcementmechanism. In the case of littering, socially-mediated reinforcement implies here that a
cleanenvironment is expressing that other people respect this normof not littering,which in response is further
being activated. Therefore, the hedonic motive becomes a relative less important driver, and the non-littering
behaviour is coupled with a reward. On the contrary, if an environment is littered, the socially-mediated re-
inforcement implies that other people disrespect the norm, and as a consequence the non-littering norm will
be inhibited. The hedonic motive becomes relatively more important, and littering behaviour becomes more
rewarding. The basic idea thus is that if the environment is in agreement with the own norm this is being expe-
rienced as a positive reinforcement of the own norm, causing an activation of the norm, whereas a disrespect
of the norm will result in an inhibition of the norm. When the norm goal is activated, the hedonic goal is less
likely to dominate behaviour than if the norm goal is inhibited.
2.3 If the behaviour being observed does not deviate too much from the norm, this is taken as confirmation of the
appropriateness of ones’ own behaviour (respect), which can be conceived as a reward. The longer the reward
is being experienced, the more positive reinforcement is experienced, resulting in an increasing activation of
the norm. On the contrary, when others are disrespecting the norm, this results in an inhibition of the norm.
2.4 In the current model, the norm is clear and one-sided, such as not littering, not parking cars on the sidewalks
and wait for ones turn. However, there are situations where the norm is not one-sided, and there may be het-
erogeneity in the ideal point. For example, people may have a dierent norm for an appropriate speed on the
road. In the current formalization we define the norm activation process as follows:
1. Agent i is initialised having a norm goal weightNi (0, 100).
2. Agent i looks at the tiles surrounding him. Lit (0, 100) is defined as the proportion of tiles holding one or
more units of litter at time t.
3. A threshold TNi (0, 100) is defined for agent i, representing his tolerance to litter. Hence, agent i will
regard the environment as clean if TNi > Lit.
4. Agent i updates his current normative goal weight Nit. For TNi > Lit he will regard the norm as dis-
respected and his normative goal weight will be weakened. Hence, Nit = Nit−1 − Nit ∗ R where R is
the reinforcement magnitude, being the same for all agents. On the other hand, for TNi < Lit agent
i will regard the norm as respected and his normative goal weight will be reinforced. Hence, Nit =
Nit−1+Nit∗R. For example, if at time t two thirds of the tiles around agent i are littered,Litwill be set to
66%. SupposeNit−1 = 10, TNi = 50% andR = 0.1. As TNi < Lit, agent iwill regard the environment
as littered and update his normative goal weight toNit = Nit−Nit−1 ∗R = 9. Mind thatTNi may dier
per agent, thus allowing for modelling a population that is heterogeneous concerning their tolerance for
litter. In the field experiments in some conditions a sign is present reminding people of a norm. The Goal
Framing Theory states that this sign does not need to address the specific behaviour in question. Hence
as found in their experiments, a sign prohibiting graiti has an eect on littering behaviour. In themodel
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Figure 1: Percentage of people not littering, in the dierent field experiment conditions (Figure adapted from
Keizer et al. (2011).
we capture this by changing the magnitude of reinforcement as a function of the presence and distance
of a sign and cleaner:
5. Rit = 1 ∗ sign-eect – if any sign is in range of agent i at time t.
2.5 The formalizations as described here allow for an agent entering a littered environment coming from a clean
environment to gradually inhibit its normative goal. It thus takes some time before the agent will litter. This
contributes to the face-validity of the formalization, as it is unrealistic that a real person would immediately
start to litter when entering a littered environment. In the presence of a sign, an agent will engage faster in
littering behaviour. In contrast, a littering agent entering a clean area will more quickly become a non-litterer
in the presence of a sign.
2.6 Themodelhasbeenprogrammed inNetlogo (Wilensky 1999), andhasbeenmadeavailableat themodel archive
of openabm.org.
Model Parameterization by Replication of an Empirical Study
3.1 In this section, we will discuss the replication of one of the field experiments presented in Keizer et al. (2011).
The challenge here is finding parameter settings for the simulation model that are capable of replicating the
empirical results of their field experiments. This validation of the model is an important step before using the
model for additional simulation experiments for which no empirical data are available yet. The experiment of
Keizer et al. (2011) aims at assessing the influence of signs of normdisrespect on individuals’ behaviour. Accord-
ing to goal-framing theory, we expect that (i) norm disrespect inhibits norm conforming of other individuals (ii)
the presence of a sign makes the norm salient, enhancing respect or disrespect of the norm.
3.2 The experiment took place in an alley where people are used to park bicycles. During their absence, a flyer was
attached to thehandle of thebicycles. When subjects came topick their bikes up, their behaviourwas recorded.
In the absenceof trashbins in the alley, subjects hadonly twochoices, throwing the flyer in the street or keeping
it. The former behaviour counted as disrespect of the anti-littering norm.
3.3 In the field experiment, two settings were varied, namely the amount of litter in the alley (clean versus dirty)
and thepresence/absenceof a "no littering" sign, thus resulting in 4 experimental conditions (clean - sign, clean
- no sign, dirty - sign, dirty - no sign). When the alley was clean, 53% of subjects conformed to the norm and did
not throw the flyer in the street. As expected, less people conformed to the normwhen the alley was filled with
litter (39%), and even less when the alley was filled with litter and the norm was made salient by a sign (30%).
On the other hand, more people respected the norm when the alley was free of litter and the norm was made
salient by a sign (61%). Figure 1, taken from Keizer et al. (2011), summarises the results of the experiment.
3.4 In our simulation, agentswalk one at the time through a 5 stepwide alley, which represents thewidth of the real
alley. Once they have reached one of the bikes, they collect one unit of litter and head to one end of the street.
During each step, they have to decide to keep the litter or throw it in the street. Flyers thrown in the street are
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Figure 2: A screen-shot of the computer simulation during the replication of the littered alley.
invisible to other agents and do not influence their behaviour (during the field experiment flyers were picked
up to preserve the chosen level of litter in the alley).
3.5 The clean alley has been modelled as an alley free of litter. For the second experimental setting, we have ran-
domly scattered a definite amount of litter in the street, the exact quantity being a parameter of the simulation.
Finally, in the third and fourth cases we have added a sign visible throughout the alley. Figure 2 shows the
simulation during the replication of the littered experimental setting.
3.6 In order to replicate the field experiment results we had to parameterise dierent variables. The following are
the variables involved in the replication of the field experiment and their intuitive eects on the outcome of the
simulation.
(i) Average hedonic goal weight. The higher this value, themore agents would be likely to ignore the norm, i.e.
to throw the flyer in the street.
(ii) Average normative goal weight. The higher this value, the more agents would be likely to conform to the
norm, i.e. to keep the flyer. For example, take the two extreme cases. If every agent weights the hedonic
goal 100 and the normative goal 0, no one is going to conform to the norm. On the other hand, if every
agent weights the normative goal 100 and the hedonic goal 0, no one is going to disrespect the norm. As
in the baseline setting (i.e. when the alley is clean) roughly half of the agents conforms to the norm, we
expect that the goal weights need to be similar.
(iii) Standard deviation on the average goal weights. The higher the standard deviation, the more the popula-
tion of agents will be heterogeneous. A population of homogeneous agents is going to bemore sensitive
to the environmental settings. For example, imagine a homogeneous population, in which every agent
weights the normative goal slightly more than the hedonic one. When the alley is clean, no flyer would
be thrown in the street. However, if the alley is littered enough to produce even a small decrease in the
normative goal weight, all agents are going to weight the hedonic goal more. Hence, every agent is now
going to behave according to its hedonic goal and start littering. On the other hand, a very heterogeneous
population is going to be less sensitive to the environmental settings. For example, imagine a population
in which half of the agents weight the hedonic goal much more than the normative one, while the other
half weights the normative goal much more than the hedonic one. Only half of the agents are going to
conform to the norm, unless the influence of the environment is strong enough to make the normative
goal prominent even in the agents who initially weight it very little. As the field experiment data show
only mild transitions from conformity to norm disrespect, we expect that the standard deviation needs
to be reasonably high.
(iv) Average reinforcementmagnitude and standard deviation. Intuitively, if this parameter is high the environ-
mental settings are going to have a large influence on agents’ behaviour, as their goal weights are going
to change fast. On the other hand, if the reinforcement is null no change will occur in the goal weights,
and agents will behave the same, regardless of the amount of litter present in the alley.
(v) Average tolerance threshold and standard deviation. The higher the threshold, the more litter in the street
agents aregoing to tolerateandconsider the street clean. On theotherhand, if the thresholdwere close to
zero, even a small amount of litter would be suicient to reinforce negatively the normative goal weight.
(vi) Walking mood. People may walk very straight towards a destination, but also may wander around in a
street, e.g., to go window-shopping. This is captured by the variable walking mood, which expresses the
degree of randomness in their walking. The more agents wander around the alley, the more they would
be likely to drop the flyer in the street. For example, imagine that agents never get out of a dirty alley. The
amount of litter would constantly reinforce negatively the normative goal weight and soon or later every
agent is going to throw his flyer in the street.
(vii) Proportion of litter in the dirty alley setting. Themore litter in the street, themore the normative goal is go-
ing to be inhibited. This parameter clearly influences only the replication of the two littered experimental
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Parameter First setting Second setting
average hedonic goal weight 51 50
average normative goal weight 49 50
standard deviation (goal weights) 10 25
average reinforcement magnitude 10 15
standard deviation (reinforcement) 5 5
average tolerance threshold 50 30
standard deviation (threshold) 10 5
walking mood 0 30
proportion of litter (experiments 2 and 3) 63 70
sign eect 2.2 2.5
Table 2: Two optimal parameter settings.
conditions. For example, if the proportion of litter is set to 100, the normative goalwill loseweight at each
agents step. On the other hand, if the proportion of litter is only slightly higher the tolerance threshold,
agents normative goal would lose weight only slightly more oen than it would gain. Notice that to ap-
proximate even qualitatively the field experiment results it is necessary that this parameter is set higher
than the tolerance threshold.
(viii)Signeect. Themore the sign is eective, themore is going toenhance the reinforcementprocess,making
more agents conform to the norm when the street is clean and more agents disrespect the norm when
the street is littered.
3.7 Almost every possible setting of such parameters would produce a qualitative replication of the field experi-
ments, e.g. more people conforming to the norm when the alley is clean. However, we have been looking for
settings which (i) produce quantitatively good replications of the field experiments (ii) are intuitively plausible.
For example, imagine a setting in which the proportion of litter when the alley is dirty is close to zero. This
setting would clearly fail to qualify as intuitively plausible and would be rejected, regardless of the fact that it
might be capable of producing accurate replications.
3.8 Parameterizing of thismodel is indeed a diicult issue because the empirical distributions are not known. A full
exploration of the parameter space seems impossible to do. Instead, we took 10,000 random parameter sets
and for each of these sets the replication experiment was ran 10 times. Next, the 100 parameter sets that repli-
cated theempirical data thebestwere selectedand ran for 1,000 times toget accurate averages. Results showed
two parameter settings with a small dierence with the empirical data, thus closely replicating the empirical
study. However, this is no definitive proof that there are not even better parameter settings. The parametrisa-
tion exploration showed that a number of alternative settings could be found that, although being not as close
as the best replications we present here, still were replicating well. Considering that a full parameter sweep
would require billions of experiments, the expectation that a replication of the field experiment would result
in (small) deviations of values against which to test, and the observation that the current parameter settings
are capable of replicating the empirical results quite accurately, we decided to focus on the two best parameter
settings. While these both replicatewith suicient accuracy the field experiment data, they are not equally con-
venient for the extension of the simulation and the further experiments. In fact, the second setting is preferable
because the standarddeviationover the average goalweights is reasonably high, allowing the simulationnot to
be too sensitive to small changes in the parameter values. Table 2 shows the details of the two settings. Figure
3 shows the average results of 1,000 simulations.
3.9 Hence, for further experimentation we will use the settings as used in the second parameter setting (Table 2).
Experimentation
4.1 The validated model allows for simulating how littering increases on a street as a function of norm inhibition,
and exploringwhat cleaning strategies are eective and eicient. Because an increase in litteringwill cause the
normtocollapse,weexpect anon-linear growth function in thedegreeof littering. If sucha transition in littering
is happening, cleaning strategies are expected to bemore eective if they succeed in keeping the levels of litter
below this transition moment. To study this in our simulation model we use a stylised street, which is wider
than the alley situation in the replication experiment. We can add trash bins and street cleaners in this street.
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Figure 3: Two possible parameter settings that approximate the field experiment results.
Ideally we would have a more realistic map to study the dynamics of littering, because walking for a longer
time in a clean or dirty street will have an impact on the (de)activation ofmotives. To capture this in our stylised
street, we decided to let the agents stay on the street for the full length of the simulation. Instead of entering
continuously new agents in the street with default settings, in the experiments when an agent leaves the street
on the le side, it enters again on the right side (and theotherway around). The street thus canbe considered to
be circular. This allows for studying the eects of the environmental conditions on the (de)activation ofmotives
over a longer period.
Transition in the littering process
4.2 We widened the street to 19 steps and populated it with 100 pedestrians, who walk freely from one side of the
street to the other. At each step of the simulation, every pedestrian has a chance of 2.5% of producing one
unit of litter. As before, agents can decide to keep the litter or throw it in the street. The simulation starts with a
clean street and litter slowly builds up. If the environment didnot influence agents’ behaviour, litterwould grow
linearly. However, given the reinforcement mechanism, we expect the opposite to happen. At the beginning,
the clean street reinforces thenormative goalweight and the amount of litter thrownon the street grows slowly.
This is because therealwayswill bea fewagents that litter becauseof their lownormativegoalweight. When the
amountof litter reaches a critical value close to themean tolerance threshold, a tippingpoint is reachedcausing
a transition in littering as someagents’ normative goalweight is suddenlyweakened. More agents start to throw
the litter in the street, weakening even further the normative goal weight of everybody else. The stronger the
reinforcement, themore salient the transitionwill be. The following graph shows how the litter builds upwhen
(i) the reinforcement is null (ii) the reinforcement is 15 - the magnitude found replicating the field experiment
(iii) the reinforcement is 15 and a sign is added.
JASSS, 20(2) 1, 2017 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/20/2/1.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3269
Figure 4: Litter doesn’t grow linearly, but a transition occurs, aer which litter grows much faster. The tipping
point can be seen as a suddenly fast growth in the units of litter produced.
4.3 This experiment shows that the reinforcement of the norm indeed works two ways; keeping the street cleaner
when the street is relatively clean, butmaking the street dirtier when a critical amount of dirt is present. Reach-
ing this tipping point in the anti-littering norm leads to a transition from a clean to a dirty street, and is more
prominent if the anti-littering sign amplifies the reinforcement of the norm.
The eect of trash bins
4.4 In the next experiment, we added trash bins. Trash bins are represented as green boxes. When an agent is
holding a unit of litter and there is at least one trash bin in the street, it now has the choice to throw it in the
bin. Throwing litter in a bin is compatible with both the normative goal – the litter is not thrown in the street –
andwith the hedonic goal âĂŞ the agent gets rids of it. However, in order to use a bin, agents have to walk to it,
deviating from their path and holding the litter for that time. Hence, a closer bin will be more attractive than a
distant one. The following Table 3 represents an agent’s payo for each possible action. The agent will choose
to perform the action that scores highest.
Keep Throw on the street Throw in a bin
Hedonic Goal 0 Hedonic goal weight ∗ (1−B) Hedonic goal weight ?B
Normative Goal Normative goal weight ∗ (1−B) 0 Normative goal weight ∗B
Total payo Normative goal weight ∗ (1−B) Hedonic goal weight ∗ (1−B) (Hedonic+ Normative goal weight) ∗B
Table 3: Pay-omatrix for the presence of bins.
4.5 An important assumption here is the attractiveness of throwing in the bin in relation to the distance to the bin.








4.6 For example, suppose agentX holds one unit of litter, his hedonic and normative goal weights are respectively
50 and 25 and is 10 steps away from the closest bin, having then B = 0.5 − 10/100 = 0.4. Its payo matrix
would look as follows (Table 4):
Keep Throw on the street Throw in a bin
Hedonic Goal 0 50 ? (1− 0.4) = 30 50 ? 0.4 = 20
Normative Goal 25 ? (1− 0.4) = 15 0 25 ? (1− 0.4) = 10
Total payo 15 30 (50 + 25) ? 0.4 = 30
Table 4: Payomatrix example for dierent courses of action.
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4.7 Hence, agentX is indierent between throwing the litter on the street and throwing it into a bin and will ran-
domly choose one of the two actions.
4.8 Trash bins have a maximum capacity of 100 units of litter. When a bin is full, it turns red and does not accept
any additional litter until it is empty again. Agents know if a bin is full only when they are next to it. If an agent
walks to a bin to throw away litter and finds it full, it will reconsider what to do, ignoring the presence of the full
bin.
Figure 5: Growing pile of litter around a full bin. The same bin is shown aer 40, 160 and 320 simulation steps.
4.9 Assuming bins are placed regularly on the street, one emergent pattern from this simple mechanism is the pil-
ing of litter next to bins, once they turn full. In fact, when an agent heads to a bin and finds it full, he is going
to be more likely to choose to trash the litter in the immediate surroundings, because the eort to reach the
next closest bin is at themaximum level. As the litter around a full bin starts to grow, the normative goal weight
of nearby agents will decrease, making them even more likely to litter on the street in the vicinity of the bin.
Whereas the litter in the absence of bins tends to spread randomly, in the bin condition we see a clear cluster-
ing of litter. This dierence can be quantified by the Gini coeicient, which is around .7 for the bin condition,
and around .2 for the no bin conditions, thus clearly indicating the strong clustering of the littering in the bin
condition.
4.10 Themore litter is clustered, the less itwill aect thenormative goalweight of agents. Most agentswill not (oen)
see the litter due to the clustering. However, if the same amount of litter would be spread randomly, all agents
would observe it and be aected. This implies that with the same amount of units of litter, the street can be
perceived as mess (if not clustered) or as almost clean (if well clustered).
4.11 Clustering of litter around a full trash bin is an emergent phenomenon that can oen be seen in reality. Figure
6 for example shows litter around a waste-bin in a park on a sunny day when the cleaning regime had not been
adjusted to the large number of visitors that day.
Figure 6: Littering around a waste bin.
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Figure 7: The sweeping strategy forces cleaners to coordinate and sweep together from le to right.
4.12 The experiments shows that the more clustered litter is, the less it will stimulate littering by norm inhibition
in other people, and on top of that it will be easier to clean. Hence, even when bins are full and litter is piled
around them it still contributes to keeping the environment relatively clean.
The eect of cleaners – exploring dierent cleaning regimes and strategies
4.13 In the next experiments, we added cleaners, having the ability to pick up litter from the street and to empty
full bins. If a cleaner happens to be on a littered patch, it will pick up one unit of litter per step. Cleaners walk
heading to the patch in sight range holding the maximum amount of litter. When a cleaner is next to a full bin,
it will empty it. Given a clean street, wemight ask howmany cleaners are needed to prevent the transition and
keep the level of litter under control. Given theparameter setting that replicates the field experiment, 4 cleaners
that walk around randomly and continuously are suicient to keep the street clean and prevent the transition
to occur.
4.14 Obviously, cleaners can work in dierent ways, and to test their performance we decided to start with an initial
condition of a dirty street. This gives a better insight in what strategy is the best in making and keeping the
street clean. To find an optimal cleaning way we have modelled 3 dierent cleaning strategies – how cleaners
coordinate with each other, and 3 dierent cleaning regimes – when and howmany cleaners are put to work –
which sums up to a total of 9 dierent cleaning conditions.
4.15 The three cleaning strategies are respectively: independent (cleaners do not coordinate), regional (each cleaner
is responsible for a fraction of the street), sweep (cleanersmove in a block, sweeping the street from le to right,
see Figure 7). The independent cleaning strategy is a base-rate condition that will not be implemented in em-
pirical situations. The regional strategy reflects the allocation of areas to certain cleaners (or teams of cleaners
in most instances), and the sweep is a massive cleaning action that occasionally is organised in combination
with inhabitants or volunteers to drastically clean a street, park or natural reserve.
4.16 The three cleaning regimes are respectively: constant (fixing the number of cleaners at 5, which is theminimum
number required to get the street clean), alternate (half of the time there are 10 cleaners, half of the time there
is none), and dynamic (the number of cleaners is adjusted according to the amount of litter in the street). The
constant is basically a base-rate condition, as in no empirical situation cleaners areworking 24/8. The alternate
schedule is more realistically capturing the regular cleaning schedule that is performed on a routine basis. The
dynamic regime is more adaptive in the sense that it responds to the amount of litter. In empirical situations,
this regime reflects the adaptation to e.g. crowded days in parks.
4.17 Suppose that hiring a cleaner cost about $0.01 per second, and each time-step in the simulation is about a
second. Further, suppose you have a budget of $500 to clean a street. What would be an eicient regime? For
example,wecouldhireone cleaner for 13.89hours, or 50,000cleaners for one second. Whereas the latter option
is clearly far from realistic, many dierent realistic combinations are possible.
4.18 Given the previous discussion, we expect the dynamic regime – in which more cleaners are hired when the
street is dirtier – to be more eicient than the constant one. If the former regime is applied, many cleaners will
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Figure 8: Results for independent working cleaners for the constant, alternate and dynamic cleaning regime.
Total-trash has beenmultiplied by 10 to make it visible in the graph.
be hired at the beginning. Once the street has been quickly cleaned, fewer cleaners will be needed to keep the
level of litter under control, because pedestrians are less likely to throw the litter in the street. Because littering
agents will always be present, a perfectly clean street is an unrealistic goal. Hence, we define a clean street as
the situation where the mean-e-norm of the agents is<30 (which is the mean threshold).
4.19 All experimental runs start with a dirty street. The number of initially littered patches (70%) is derived from the
dirty condition of the replication experiment, and the clustering of the litter is also derived from this simulation.
If the street were not dirty at the start, the experiment would be trivial for the dynamic regime (the number of
cleaners would settle between 4 and 5).
4.20 As dependent variables we measure the time for which the cleaning budget of e500 lasts, the total litter at
the street aer the budget has been finished, the total litter being picked up by the cleaners, the time to clean
indicating how fast a clean level has been reached, the dollars-to-clean expresses the number of cleaning hours
required to reach a clean condition (mean-e-norm of the agents is < 30).
The eect of independent cleaners
4.21 In the following Figure 8, results are presented for the independent strategy (base-rate condition), comparing
the performance of respectively the constant, alternating and dynamic regime.
4.22 The experiment shows that the budget last the longest with a dynamic regime. Here, the litter is removed fast,
and the resulting cleaner environmentwill stimulate the activation of the norm,which keeps littering at a lower
level. Indeed, the total litter is lower in the dynamic regime. For the alternating regime, the opposite holds, as
when the cleaners are onpause, the littering increases, causing the norm to collapse, causing a serious increase
in littering. Therefore, when the cleaners start working again they are confronted with a lot of litter, which can
be seen in the total-litter and the amount of picked-up-litter-to-clean.
4.23 Whereas it is possible to conduct statistical analysis on these, and later results of our simulation experiments,
we decided not to run statistical tests (ANOVA) because of two reasons. First, testing for significant eects using
simulation models is less meaningful because of the lack of unexplained variance (deterministic model) in the
model. Therefore, significant eect can be obtained easily by running more experiments. A second reason to
conduct statistical analysis is to get meaningful summaries of complicated datasets. Considering our relative
simple experimental set-up our results are accessible for interpretation without additional statistics.
4.24 Looking at the number of cleaners (Figure 9), we see that the number of cleaners in the dynamic regime starts
at 19, but at t = 750 it crosses the fixed line of 5 cleaners, and aerwards 4 cleaners are required to keep the
street clean.
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Figure 9: Number of cleaners over time for the 3 cleaning regimes.
4.25 The following Figure 10 shows that the dynamic regime is the most eective in keeping the hedonic goal on a
low level, thus reducing the agents’ motive to litter.
Figure 10: Dominance of the hedonic goal for the 3 cleaning regimes.
The eect of regional cleaners
4.26 In the following Figure 11, results are presented for the regional strategy, where the cleaners have their own
region in the street, comparing the performance of respectively the constant, alternating and dynamic regime.
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Figure 11: Results for regionally working cleaners for the constant, alternate and dynamic cleaning regime.
4.27 We observe that again the dynamic strategy is lasting the longest with the budget, however we also observe
that the total-litter is the highest compared to the constant and alternating regimes.
The eect of a sweep strategy
4.28 In the following Figure 12, results are presented for the condition where the cleaners sweep the street, again
comparing the performance of respectively the constant, alternating and dynamic regime.
Figure 12: Results for sweeping cleaners for the constant, alternate and dynamic cleaning regime.
4.29 It can be observed that the dynamic strategy now is the first one running out of budget. Yet this strategy clearly
remains superior when looking at the performance in keeping the street clean.
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Figure 13: Number of cleaners required to keep the street clean for dierent numbers of bins.
Comparing the strategies and regimes
4.30 The most striking dierence in performance can be seen between the dynamic regime and the constant and
alternating regimes. The dynamic regime outperforms the other regimes in all three strategies, and the dy-
namic regime with independent strategy is the most eective way to clean the street because the budget last
longest and the street is cleaned the fastest. This indicates that being adaptive to the amount of litter is crucial
in eective cleaning.
4.31 Next we see that the regional cleaning strategy, where cleaners are allocated to their own area of the street,
performs in all three regimes better or almost equal as the independent and sweep strategies. Interesting is
that in most cases the region strategy performs best, but that in the dynamic regime the independent cleaning
strategy performs best.
4.32 Looking in more detail at the dierences, it can be observed that the time before out of budget is stable for
the constant and alternating regimes, which is logical due to the fixed number of cleaners. However, for the
dynamic regime we observe that if the cleaners work independent, the budget lasts longer. If however the
dynamic regime is implemented in a sweep strategy, a very large number of cleaners are initially used to sweep
the street, which ultimately causes a somewhat faster depletion of the budget.
4.33 Lookingat the time required toclean thestreet, this last strategyofdynamic sweeping is the fastestwayof clean-
ing the street. We observe that the performance of regimes is coupled with the strategy that is implemented.
In case of the constant regime, the independent strategy takes the most time, and the sweep is the fastest,
whereas for the alternating regime the sweep takes the most time, and the regional strategy is the fastest.
4.34 If we look at the dollars needed to clean the street, we also observe here that the performance of regimes is
coupled with the strategy that is implemented. For both the constant and dynamic regimes the independent
strategy is the most expensive and the sweep the cheapest. For the alternating regime the sweep is the most
expensive, and the regional strategy the cheapest.
4.35 Finally, for a constant regime we observe that sweeping is better than independent cleaning, whereas for the
alternating regime the opposite holds.
Combining cleaners with bins
4.36 Because bins cause thatmorewaste is being deposited in the bins, or when the bins are filled, cause that waste
is concentrated around the bin rather than being scattered, it can be expected that more bins make cleaning
easier. To test this we ran the model with a dynamic cleaning regime, which allowed us to keep track of how
many agents were required to keep the street clean for a dierent number of cleaners (Figure 13).
4.37 Results confirm our expectation, showing fewer cleaners are needed if more bins are installed. However, this
eect logically decreased when more bins are added. Whereas this eect is relevant, in the current model it is
very stylised and the results do not provide practical guidelines for the optimal number of bins to place.
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Conclusions and Discussion
5.1 This paper demonstrates how the Goal Framing Theory can be implemented in an agent based model, and
how the parameterization can be done using empirical experimental data. The parameterization of the model
proved to be a complicated matter. Whereas it was possible to find model parameters that were capable of
replicating the empirical data very well, the parameterization also revealed that dierent parameter settings
were also pretty close to the empirical data. Realizing that replications of the field experiment would probably
have resulted in slightly dierent empirical values, the fundamental question arises how valid parameterisa-
tions are when limited datasets from in principle social complex phenomena are available. Assuming that our
parameterisation exercise resulted in a validmodel, we can runa largenumberof experiments exploring the im-
pacts of dierent policies simultaneously in a stylisedmanner. This contributes to the identification of possible
eective combinations of policies, which subsequently can be tested in field experiments. In particular, testing
the eect of dierent cleaning regimes would require similar field settings, which is very diicult to control for.
Moreover, changing a cleaning regime is quite costly, and not knowing beforehand what themost likely eects
are makes experimentation a risky business. If in an experiment the cleaning fails, the non-littering norm will
be weakened and it may take a lot of eort to reverse the situation.
5.2 The simulations thusoer aquick and safe tool to explore the eicacyof dierent cleaning strategies, and select
settings to explore inmore detail using field experiments. The simulation experiments however do not provide
exact predictions of the eects of cleaning strategies in reality. One has to realise well that (1) in reality many
small (and unknown) factors may have a significant impact on littering behaviour, and (2) that the eects as
obtained with the simulation model, despite their empirical based parameterization, partly depend on crude
assumptionsone.g. reinforcementandperception. Simulationexperiments thus raiseempirical questions con-
cerning the causal mechanisms operating in a theory. The results are thusmore indicative concerning the type
of behavioural dynamics causing certain eects, and possible eective strategies to manage these dynamics.
Hence, simulation experiments may reveal interesting strategies, and thus provide interesting venues for field
experimentation. Specifically, the finding that in most cases the region strategy performs best, except for in
the dynamic regime where the independent cleaning strategy performs best is interesting to explore further.
This is relevant because choosing a particular cleaning strategy is important for the planning of cleaning op-
erations. If large field experiments are diicult to study such questions, e.g. because it requires a very flexible
eort of cleaning companies, it might be better to first improve the realism of the simulated cleaning envi-
ronment. This would be possible by implementing the model on a virtual map of a city (augmented reality),
including empirical data on litter production on dierent areas (e.g. related to litter generating sources such as
fast-food restaurants, special events), and explore in collaborationwith stakeholders the performance of dier-
ent cleaning strategies. Such agent based gaming context may prove to be very useful in exploring possibilities
for managing social-environmental dynamics (e.g., Jager & van der Vegt 2015).
5.3 The current stylised experiments demonstrate that an adaptive/dynamical cleaning regime is oenmore eec-
tive than constant or alternating regimes. Preventing a tipping point (Nyborg et al. 2016) in the anti-littering
norm requires a close monitoring and cleaning of the environment. On the other hand, in case an area is al-
ready littered, it is faster and cheaper to employ a large number of cleaners just for the time suicient to bring
the amount of litter under the critical value. The number of cleaners can then be adjusted to the minimum
required to prevent the level of litter to reach again a tipping point in the norm. A practical question is how
dynamic such a strategy should be. Obviously being too responsive will require a lot of monitoring and flexible
cleaners, which will come at a cost. Practical experimentation will be required to find an optimal adaptation
level for dierent situations.
5.4 The experiments also indicate that allocating cleaners to a certain region is more eective. Clearly, this avoids
a clustering of cleaners at a certain place, whichwould allow for the littering to grow in other unattended areas.
The question for practice is obviously how large these regions should be. A related question is if it ismore eec-
tive to allocate (small) teams to larger regions, or individual cleaners to smaller regions. Before experimenting
in the field, it is recommended to conduct simulation experiments in amore realistic spatial settingwith a num-
ber of cleaners that is available for this particular area. Simulating for example a shopping area with cleaners
would be a good start for this.
5.5 Another interesting eect demonstrated in the simulation experiments is the beneficial eects of bins, even
when theyarenotemptied. Becausebins contribute to theclusteringof litter, e.g. thinkof filledbins surrounded
by litter, the rest of the area remains cleaner, and so the norm is less inhibited resulting in less littering. Whereas
one is likely to consider an overflowing bin as a negative event, the awareness of the positive eect of this only
becomes clear aer understanding the behavioural dynamics in this system.
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5.6 Whereas the current model shows some stylised eects in a simple artificial environment, a challenge is to
implementmore realistic environments in themodel, and implement existing cleaning regimes. This would re-
quire amore realistic environment, such as an areamap or a virtual environment, and data on pedestrian flows
related to time of the day, day of the week, dierent types of litter (e.g. cigarette butts, chewing gum, fast-food
packaging) special events (festivals) and perhaps evenweather conditions. Even punishing regimes for littering
could be considered, as for example littering in some places is not being punished, whereas in Singapore the
fines for littering range from $2,000 for a first conviction to $10,000 for third and subsequent convictions. If the
model canbeparameterised as to represent the littering and cleaning patterns in practice, themodel is suitable
to experiment with cleaning regimes in specific situations, e.g. a shopping area in a city.
5.7 Of particular interest is experimentingwith the visibility of cleaners. Whereas cleaning regimes have oen been
developed to interfere as little as possible with pedestrians – e.g. clean during quiet hours, it might actually
be more eective to clean during rush hours. Sentse et al. (2010) demonstrated that the presence of signifi-
cant others who respect situational norms strengthen the normative goal evenmore than ‘ordinary’ people do.
Unlike the sign, which in littered conditions may emphasise that most people do not comply with the norm,
this behavioural example of a cleaner will serve as a cue strengthening the norm also in littered environments.
Whereas technically it is easier to cleanwhen it is quiet, cleaning in a rush hour will have amuch stronger eect
on theweighting of the norm, and thus result in a litter preventing eect. The question is if cleaning during rush
hours results in suchadecreaseof the littering that it outweighs the technical objectionsagainst cleaningduring
rush hours. Exploring possible cleaning strategies using a theoretically sound and empirically parameterised
model is expected to contribute to the identification of more eicient strategies to keep our cities cleaner at
lower costs.
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